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Response	  of	  William	  Major	  and	  Andrew	  McMurry	  
William	  Major	  (University	  of	  Hartford)	  and	  Andrew	  McMurry	  (University	  of	  Waterloo)	  
	  
We	   thank	   Roman	   Bartosch	   and	   Greg	   Garrard	   for	   their	   thoughtful	   and	   temperate	   critique	   of	   our	  
introduction	   to	   a	   recent	   special	   issue	   of	   Journal	   of	   Ecocriticism.	   Their	   response	   contains	   a	   number	   of	  
valuable	  insights	  about	  the	  roles	  of	  ecocriticism,	  the	  humanities,	  and	  teaching	  in	  the	  present	  and	  largely	  
foundering	  academic	  archipelago,	  and	  we	  find	  much	  to	  agree	  with.	  They	  would	  also	  distance	  themselves	  
from	  the	  discourse	  of	  apocalypticism	  and	  instead	  align	  with	  the	  go-­‐slow	  approach	  of	  traditional	  literary	  
inquiry	  and	  the	  life	  of	  the	  scholar—even	  the	  scholar	  whose	  watching	  and	  waiting	  has	  brought	  her	  to	  the	  
unassailable	  conclusion	  that	  her	  kids	  and	  grandkids	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  similarly	  “lean	  and	  loaf”	  at	  their	  
ease	  even	  if	  they	  do	  produce	  scholarship	  that	  fosters	  the	  “prismatic	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  classroom”	  
(Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  2)	  upon	  which	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard’s	   cautious	  optimism	   teeters.	  But	  more	  on	  
pedagogy	  later.	  
	   First	   things	   first.	   We	   suspect	   that	   what	   most	   troubled	   Bartosch	   and	   Garrard	   was	   that	   we	   threw	  
them—or,	   rather,	   their	   Call	   for	   Papers	   for	   a	   conference	   in	   Cologne1—under	   the	   humanist	   bus.	   They	  
return	  the	  favour,	  noting	  that	  we	  ourselves	  “behave	  like	  exemplary	  humanist	  scholars.”	  About	  that	  bus:	  
these	  days,	  not	  many	  literary	  critics	  wish	  to	  be	  on	  it,	  let	  alone	  under	  it.	  Humanism,	  this	  middle	  ground	  
philosophy	  that	  rejects	  transcendent	  references	  as	  much	  as	  it	  eschews	  baldly	  materialist	  ones,	  is	  out	  of	  
fashion	  (although,	  as	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  remind	  us,	  humanism	  can	  also	  embody	  an	  admirable	  notion	  
of	   the	   humane	   and	   a	   pointed	   acknowledgement	   of	   our	   species’	   fallibility).	   Some	   one-­‐time	   humanists	  
now	  prefer	  to	  style	  themselves	  post-­‐humanists,	  a	  positionality	  meant	  to	  signal	  their	  disavowal	  of	  human	  
arrogance,	   anthropocentrism,	   and	   essentialism,	   amongst	   other	   things.	   Posthumanists	   content	  
themselves	  with	  a	  modest	  claim	  to	  plain	  citizenship	  in	  the	  commonwealth	  of	  species.	  	  
	   One	  unfortunate	  relic	  of	  humanism	  that	  we	  detect	   in	  many	   intellectuals	  may	  be	  said	   to	   fall	  under	  
the	  rhetorical	  category	  of	  stance	   (Booth)	  or	  attitude	   (Burke).	  What	  does	  a	  humanist	  stance	  or	  attitude	  
look	  like,	  intellectually	  speaking?	  Gramsci,	  as	  an	  example,	  suggested	  that	  one	  might	  do	  well	  to	  espouse	  a	  
pessimism	  of	  the	  intellect	  but	  an	  optimism	  of	  the	  will.	  We	  think	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  would	  probably	  
approve	  of	  that	  stance,	  which	  we	  take	  to	  be	  an	  epitome	  of	  the	  humanist	  spirit	  of	  inquiry.	  Implicitly,	  this	  
optative	  mood	  is	  considered	  upright,	  courageous,	  and	  indispensable.	  	  
	   Where	  we	  part	  ways	  with	  all	  humanisms	  most	  decisively	   is	  that	  we	  have	  abandoned	  this	  disabling	  
rhetoric	  of	  the	  hopeful	  spirit.	  That	   is	  because	  we	  think	  that	  optimism	  of	  the	  will	   too	  often	   inhibits	  the	  
operations	   of	   the	   intellect	   and	   the	  move	   to	   praxis.	  No	   surprise	   that	   hope	  happens:	   everything	   in	   our	  
culture	  encourages	  us,	  as	  Monty	  Python	  had	  it,	  to	  look	  on	  the	  bright	  side	  of	  life.	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  one	  of	  
the	  articles	  of	  secular	  humanist	  faith	  that	  what	  man	  has	  harmed	  he	  can,	  with	  a	  more	  reasonable,	  patient	  
application	   of	   his	   intellect	   and	   moral	   compass,	   unharm.	   But	   we	   think	   this	   is	   just	   the	   hopeful	   spirit	  
working	  its	  voodoo,	  turning	  vinegar	  into	  wine	  and	  frowns	  upside	  down.	  
	   Don’t	  take	  us	  wrong:	  it	  is	  not	  the	  arrogance	  of	  humanism	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  here;	  it’s	  the	  attitude	  
of	   humanism.	   Give	   engineers	   a	   challenge,	   and	   they’ll	   roll	   up	   their	   sleeves	   and	   say,	   “let’s	   work	   the	  
problem.”	  Engineers	   fervently	  believe	   in	   the	   techno-­‐fix	   (what	  Bill	  McKibben	  calls	   “the	  defiant	   reflex”).	  
What	  do	  humanists	  believe	  in?	  The	  dialogue-­‐fix.	  We	  work	  the	  problem	  through	  the	  Socratic	  circle.	  In	  this	  
scheme,	  there’s	  no	  time	  for	  hand-­‐wringing,	  only	  tongue-­‐wagging,	  which	  is	  our	  kind	  of	  doing.	  Now,	  if	  we	  
humanists	  and	  posthumanists	  don't	  like	  to	  think	  of	  ourselves	  as	  can-­‐do	  pragmatists,	  that's	  only	  because	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we've	   been	   trained	   to	   imagine	   our	   penchant	   for	   problematizing	   and	   complicating	   signals	   our	  
commendable	  skepticism,	  long-­‐circuit	  thinking,	  and	  inclusivity.	  We	  don’t	  panic;	  we	  dilate.	  We	  are	  useful	  
eggheads:	  hard,	  not	   soft,	  boiled.	   In	  normal	   times,	  we	  can	  be	  quite	  endearing.	  But	   in	  a	   crisis,	  our	  very	  
strengths	  may	  work	  against	  us.	  We	  become	  the	  know-­‐it-­‐all	  in	  the	  cinematic	  hostage	  scene	  who	  steps	  up	  
to	  the	  gun-­‐wielding	  villains,	  saying,	  “I	  am	  a	  trained	  negotiator.	  Let’s	  all	  just	  take	  a	  deep	  breath.	  I’m	  sure	  
we	  can	  work	  this	  out.”	  We	  all	  know	  what	  happens	  to	  that	  guy.	  
	   We	  despair	  that	  one	  day	  homo	  academicus	  will	  wake	  up	  to	  find	  that	  what	  he	  thought	  was	  wisdom	  
about	  the	  current	  crisis	  was	  nothing	  but	  willful	  blindness	  elevated	  to	  virtue.	  He	  will	  realize	  that	  he	  was	  
not	  just	  a	  frog	  in	  a	  pot	  but	  a	  frog	  in	  a	  pot	  who	  thought	  he	  was	  St.	  Jerome	  in	  his	  study.	  Thus	  in	  their	  CFP	  
Garrard	   and	   Bartosch	   wish	   to	   exclude	   apocalypticism	   and	   “environmentalist	   propaganda”	   from	   their	  
cosmopolitan	  conference	   just	  as	   they	  would	   like	   to	  exclude	   it	   from	  “the	  daily	  practice	  of	   teaching	   the	  
humanities	   and	   arts.”	   This	   preference	   for	   the	   Burkean	   comic	   frame	   is	   consistent	   with	   Garrard’s	  
perspective,	   as	   announced	   in	   his	   influential	   primer,	   Ecocriticism.	   Tragic	   apocalypticism,	   he	   notes,	  
polarizes	   audiences,	   plays	   into	   the	   media’s	   preference	   for	   sensationalism,	   eliminates	   nuance	   and	  
complexity,	  promotes	  villainization,	  and	  generally	  muddies	   the	  waters	  of	   rational	  debate.	  At	   its	  worst,	  
the	  “rhetoric	  of	  catastrophism	  tends	  to	  ‘produce’	  the	  crisis	  it	  describes,	  as	  in	  the	  Malthusian	  depiction	  of	  
extreme	  poverty	  as	  ‘famine’”	  (105).	  
	   These	  are	  important	  observations,	  and	  we	  go	  along	  with	  them	  to	  some	  extent.	  But	  not	  all	  the	  way.	  
We	   maintain,	   against	   Bartosch	   and	   Garrard,	   that	   discourses	   of	   fear,	   foreboding,	   and	   pessimism	   are	  
appropriate	  objective	  correlatives	  for	  the	  whirlwind	  of	  terrifying	  ecological	  facts	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  
daily.	  These	  latter	  must	  be	  engaged	  in	  their	  full	  horror,	  not	  blunted	  in	  advance	  by	  ratiocination.	  It	  is	  thus	  
the	  safeguarding	  into	  reasoned	  equipoise	  that	  we	  object	  to,	  in	  the	  university	  and	  elsewhere.	  We	  believe	  
Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  are	  too	  quick	  to	  usher	  the	  Other	  of	  scholarly	  ethos	  and	   logos	  out	  the	  classroom	  
door,	  and	  too	  ready	  to	  assume	  “catastrophe”	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  can	  be	  stipulated	  to	  and	  moved	  past,	  as	  if	  
it	  is	  merely	  one	  more	  item	  in	  the	  lading-­‐list	  of	  apocalyptic	  misfires,	  a	  distraction	  from	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  
slow	   reading	   and	   slow	   thought.	  We	   say,	   “not	   so	   fast.”	   Neither	   democracy	   or	   criticism	   are	   served	   by	  
downplaying	  the	  palpable,	  chilling	  signals	  of	  environmental	  collapse.	  Granted,	  we	  have	  a	  long	  history	  of	  
unrequited	  millennial	  expectations	  and	  apocalyptic	  doomsaying,	  stemming	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  traditions	  
and	   dispositions.	   But	   to	  what	   end	   do	  we	   link	   our	   current	   ecological	   crisis	  with	   that	   kind	   of	   thinking?	  
There	   is	  vast	  gulf	  between	  the	  Book	  of	  Revelations	  and	  391	  ppm	  of	  carbon	  dioxide,	  and	  we	  ecocritics	  
know	   it.	   The	   conflation	  of	  ecocatastrophe	  and	  end-­‐of-­‐the-­‐worldism	  has	  been	   the	   rhetorical	   gambit	  of	  
right	  wing	   denialists	   and	   liberal	   Pollyannas	   alike;	   it	   does	   not	   serve	   ecocriticism	  well	   to	   say,	   "Tut,	   tut.	  
Some	  people	  always	  believe	  the	  sky	  is	  falling;	  let’s	  not	  lower	  ourselves	  to	  that	  discussion."	  	  
	   We	  believe	   that	   the	   stiff-­‐upper	   lip,	   go-­‐slow	  position	   costs	  us	   immensely.	  We	  believe	   that	   there	   is	  
actually	  much	  to	  fear	  besides	  fear	  itself,	  that	  the	  quasi-­‐official	  stance	  of	  optimism	  has	  its	  own	  risks.	  We	  
believe	  that	  what	  remained	  in	  Pandora’s	   jar	  after	  the	  evils	  escaped—i.e.,	  hope-­‐-­‐is	  no	  longer	  our	  friend	  
but	  our	  enemy,	  a	  mischief	   in	   its	  own	  right	  that	   lets	  us	   lay	  off	  hard	  decisions	  onto	  futurity.	  We	  caution	  
that	  the	  cerebral	  modulation	  of	  unmitigated	  environmental	  disaster	   is	  a	  mistake,	  a	  kind	  of	  preemptive	  
quietism,	  politically	  speaking,	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  a	  culture	  that	  overwhelmingly	  prefers	  the	  “feel-­‐good”	  
ending.	   It	   is	   speculated	   that	   the	   tragic	   frame	   enervates	   by	   overplaying	   pathos	   and	   melodrama,	   and	  
perhaps	   it	   does.	   But	   so	   too	   does	   the	   comic	   frame,	   with	   its	   glass	   half-­‐full	   approach,	   enervate	   by	  
overplaying	  reason	  and	  composure.2	  
	   We	  turn	  now	  to	  ecocriticism	  and	  didactics.	  Ecocriticism	  is	  not	  special.	  We	  perhaps	  once	  thought	   it	  
was	  special;	  we	  perhaps	  bought	  into	  the	  first	  wave	  critique	  of	  postmodernism	  that	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  
(and	  others)	   rightly	   identify	  as	   the-­‐then	  proper	  response	  to	  pomo	  hyperexuberance.	  There	  was	  a	  gap,	  
ethical	   and	   critical,	   and	   ecocritics	   sought—mostly	   successfully—to	   fill	   it.	   Yet	   the	   fact	   that	   ecocritical	  
scholars	  privileged	  the	  biosphere	  they	  identified	  as	  a	  neglected	  area	  of	  literary	  critical	   intervention	  did	  
not,	  we	  submit,	  make	  their	  work	  any	  more	  useful	  in	  terms	  of	  addressing	  the	  practical	  problems	  it	  raised.	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Thus	  the	  abstractions	  of	  the	  postmodern,	  to	  which	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  refer,	  are	  the	  real	  straw	  men	  
now	  that	  early	  ecocriticism	  has	  come	  and	  gone	  and	  things	  are	  getting	  worse,	  and	  there’s	  no	  way	  that	  
they	  are	  going	  to	  get	  better,	   if	   reports	   from	  the	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  summit	   in	  Doha,	  Qatar,	  are	  to	  be	  
believed.	  As	  of	  this	  writing,	  greenhouse	  gases	  emissions	  were	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high	  in	  2012,	  over	  14	  years	  
after	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	   was	   adopted.	   But	   we	   already	   know	   this.	   We	   also	   know	   there’s	   nothing,	  
practically	  speaking,	  we	  can	  do	  about	  it.	  
	   Ecocriticism	   thinks	   it	   is	   special,	   and	   this	   is	   a	   problem.	   It	   has	   set	   itself	   up	   from	   its	   earliest	   days	   as	  
attending,	   in	   ways	   that	   previous	   critical	   modes	   had	   not,	   to	   what	   had	   been	   mostly	   neglected	   in	   the	  
Weltanschauung:	  places,	  ecologies,	  non-­‐human	  others,	  and	  so	  on.	  It	  cultivated	  approaches	  to	  texts	  that	  
thrust	  these	  entities	  into	  the	  view	  of	  fellow	  scholars,	  students,	  even	  the	  wider	  public	  in	  some	  cases.	  That	  
ecocriticism	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  tending	  to	  that	  garden	  in	  the	  current	  global	  context	  is	  perhaps	  in	  its	  
favor;	  we	  can	  say	  that	  although	  the	  world	  is	  not	  much	  less	  oblivious	  to	  its	  incipient	  demise	  since	  our	  kind	  
of	  thing	  came	  into	  being,	  it	  could	  clearly	  be	  more	  so.	  We	  have	  done	  no	  harm,	  in	  other	  words,	  and	  there	  
are	  certainly	  arguments	  to	  be	  made—and	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  make	  them—that	   it’s	   too	  soon	  to	  tell	  
whether	  we’ve	   done	   some	   good.	  We’ll	   just	   have	   to	  wait	   and	   see.	   But	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   ecocriticism	  
possesses	  a	  hard	  kernel,	  an	  ethical	  center	  that	  cannot	  be	  overcome,	  that	  cannot	  be	  out-­‐theorized,	  that	  
cannot	   be	   postmoderned	  out	   of	   existence	  or	   rhetorically	   invalidated,	   and	   that	   center	   is	   its	   animating	  
force…well,	   because	   that	   hard	   kernel	   tasks	   us,	   dogs	   us,	  we	   suppose	  we	  must	   acknowledge	   there	   is	   a	  
disappointed	   liberal	   humanist	   in	   both	   of	   us,	   borrowing	   from	   Patrick	   Curry’s	   useful	   recuperation	   of	  
humility	   (qtd.	   in	   Bartosch	   and	   Garrard	   (4).	   And	   because	   ecocriticism	   has	   failed	   to	   live	   up	   to	   our	  
expectations,	  because	  it	  begins	  to	  look,	  twenty	  years	  or	  so	  in,	  more	  or	  less	  like	  just	  another	  professional	  
discourse	   among	   professional	   discourses	   (which	   it	   is),	   routinized	   into	   the	   low-­‐stakes	   academic	   poker	  
game,	  yes,	  for	  sure,	  this	  gives	  us	  pause.	  
	   Of	  course,	  the	  failure	  is	  in	  part	  our	  own;	  it	  is	  one	  of	  those	  unfulfilled	  humanist	  expectations,	  “how	  to	  
change	   the	  world”	   and	   etc.,	   the	   beliefs	  we	  may	   have	   had	   in	   graduate	   school	   about	   “discourse	   being	  
practice,”	  and	  that	  sort	  of	  blather.	  And	  we	  plead	  guilty	  to	  once	  believing	  that	  working	  out	  an	  explication	  
de	  texte	  was	  just	  a	  step	  away	  from	  manning	  a	  barricade.	  Anyway,	  we	  hoped	  it	  was.	  We	  may	  as	  well	  have	  
been	  New	  Critics,	  except	  that	  they	  had	  an	  audience.	  Between	  then	  and	  now,	  there	  have	  been	  too	  many	  
conferences,	  too	  many	  papers,	  too	  many	  books,	  where	  the	  so	  very	  high	  stakes	  of	  a	  livable	  planet	  came	  
down	  to	  “here’s	  a	  new	  way	  to	  think	  about	  this”	  or	  “if	  we	  learn	  to	  talk	  about	  objects	  using	  these	  terms,	  
the	  ones	   I	  have	  derived	  by	   running	   this	  poem	  through	  quantum	  physics	  and	  Lacan,	   then	  we	  might	  be	  
able	  to	  reenchant	  the	  world,	  or	  heal	  the	  circle	  of	  life,	  or	  get	  our	  heads	  on	  straight...”	  Sounds	  a	  bit	  like	  a	  
fairy	  tale,	  doesn’t	  it,	  when	  you	  hear	  from	  a	  few	  feet	  back?	  Or	  some	  kind	  of	  ersatz	  New	  Age	  religion?	  Was	  
this	  how	  L.	  Ron	  Hubbard	  started?	  But	  then	  he	  had	  charisma.	  To	  be	  sure,	  we	  like	  this	  kind	  of	  talk,	  don’t	  
get	  us	  wrong,	  and	  we’ve	  uttered	  it,	  too.	  But	  where	  is	  it	  going?	  Does	  it	  add	  up	  to	  something?	  Is	  it	  more	  
than	  whistling	  past	   the	  graveyard?	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  say,	   in	  effect,	  we’re	  paying	   it	   forward	   to	  our	  
students.	  Maybe	  so.	  We	  want	  to	  know	  more	  about	  how	  that	  process	  works,	  because	  if	  ever	  there	  was	  a	  
time	  to	  ponder	  the	  question	  of	  literary	  criticism’s	  relevance,	  it’s	  right	  now.	  That	  is	  what	  our	  special	  issue	  
was	  meant	  to	  consider.	  
	   Which	  leads	  us	  to	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard’s	  warnings	  about	  the	  downside	  of	  the	  “instrumentalising	  of	  
literature	   (2).	  We	  concede	   the	  point	   full	   in	   the	  knowledge	   that	   the	  specters	  of	  Stanley	  Fish	  and	  David	  
Horowitz	  hover	  behind	  us	  every	  time	  we	  bring	  politics	  into	  the	  classroom.	  Frankly,	  we	  don’t	  know	  what	  
literature	   is	   supposed	   to	   do,	   whether	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	   make	   us	   better	   or	   more	   ethical	   people,	   or	  
whether	   it	  does	  this	   for	  our	  students,	  who	  seem	  to	  have	  their	  own	  problems.	  We	  also	  admit	  that	   it	   is	  
simply	  impossible	  to	  teach	  and	  not	  preach,	  at	  least	  a	  little	  bit,	  which	  is	  why	  John	  Parhams’s	  idea	  to	  put	  
our	  cards	  on	  the	  table	  seems	  about	  right,	  and	  certainly	  takes	  the	  starch	  out	  of	   the	  academic	  guessing	  
game.	  No	  one	  has	  ever	  said	  to	  either	  one	  of	  us	  to	  stop	  preaching	  and,	  anyway,	  the	  books	  themselves,	  
the	   literature	   that	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   be	   instrumentalized,	   seem	   to	   do	   that	   quite	   well.	   If	   literature	  
Journal	  of	  Ecocriticism	  5(1)	  January	  2013	  
 
	  
Response	  (1-­‐5)	   	   4	  
“makes	  us	  better	  noticers	  of	  life”	  (Wood	  53,	  qtd.	  in	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  3)	  and	  if	  books	  can	  potentially	  
“bring	  the	  student	   into	  a	  singular	  and	  unpredictable	  encounter	  with	  otherness”	  (Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  
3),	   then	  all	   the	  better,	   though	  we	  aren’t	  quite	  sure	  there	  aren’t	  other	  such	  encounters	  that	  will	  effect	  
the	  same.	  	  
	   What	  brings	  us	  up	  short,	  however,	  and	  where	  we	  draw	  the	  rhetorical	  line	  (since	  there	  is	  no	  other),	  is	  
in	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard’s	  position,	  in	  citing	  the	  invaluable	  contrast	  between	  praxis	  and	  criticism,	  that	  
twinges	   of	   conscience	   and	   organisational	   ethics	   are	   not	   the	   same	   as	   theoretical	  
scholarship	   with	   its	   prerogative	   for	   critical	   and	   thorough	   analysis,	   evidence	   and	  
argumentative	  plausibility.	  If	  ecocritical	  practices	  were	  simply	  restricted	  to	  transforming	  
scientific	  findings	  into	  environmental	  activism	  (as	  if	  those	  things	  always	  align)	  we	  would	  
sell	   our	   competences	   remarkably	   short,	   and	   that	   is	   to	   say	   nothing,	   yet,	   about	   the	  
responsibilities	  of	  being	  teachers.	  (3)	  
We	  think	  that	  such	  “twinges	  of	  conscience,”	  such	  as	  those	  referenced	  by	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  (ASLE-­‐
UKI	   has	   gone	   vegetarian;	   SKYPE	   lectures	   and	   conference	   presentations),	   are	   actually	   as	   necessary	   as	  
theoretical/critical	   investments.	   We	   think	   that	   we	   need	   more	   “twinges	   of	   conscience,”	   just	   as	   we	  
devoutedly	   acquiesce	   to	   the	   blandishments	   of	   “successful	   scholars[hip]”	   that	   whisks	   us	   around	   the	  
globe.	  What’s	  wrong	  with	  conscience	  and	  ethics,	  anyway?	  “Theoretical	  scholarship	  with	  its	  prerogative	  
for	  critical	  and	  thorough	  analysis,	  evidence	  and	  argumentative	  plausibility”	  (Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  3)	   is	  
useless	  without	   them.	  No	   one	   is	   suggesting	   that	  we	   not	   think	   things	   through,	   that	  we	   not	   rigorously	  
examine	  scientific	  and	  humanist	  claims,	  that	  we	  not	  utilize	  all	   the	  tools	  at	  our	  disposal	   in	  our	  criticism	  
and	  teaching.	  This	   isn’t	  a	  Samuel	  Beckett	  play;	  we	  can	  do	  something,	  and	  to	  paraphrase	  Thoreau,	   this	  
does	  not	  mean	  we	  have	  to	  do	  everything.	  We	  simply	  aren’t	  sure	  we	  know	  what	  to	  do,	  and	  that	  what	  we	  
are	  doing	  is	  doing	  what	  we	  think	  it	  does.	  But	  we	  do	  know	  that	  more	  of	  the	  same	  has	  the	  potential	  for	  
more	  of	  the	  same.	  Which	  is	  unacceptable.	  Which	  is	  immoral,	  too.	  And	  ours	  is	  hardly	  an	  “anti-­‐intellectual	  
attempt	   to	   play	   down	   the	   relevance	   of	   thorough	   analysis,	   interrogation,	   self-­‐critique	   and	   constant	  
negotiation	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  saving	  the	  planet”	  (Bartosch	  and	  Garrard	  4);	  we	  do	  
not	  work	  for	  the	  FOX	  Network.	  We	  are,	  after	  all,	  “exemplary	  humanist	  scholars.”	  	  
	   It	  is	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  teaching	  that	  our	  diverse	  perspectives	  converge,	  and	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  good	  
work	  that	  Garrard	  has	  done	  in	  this	  realm.	  The	  CFP	  that	  struck	  the	  wrong	  note	  with	  us	  seemed,	  however,	  
to	  immediately	  cancel	  the	  type	  of	  dialogue	  we	  are	  now	  having,	  albeit	  from	  afar.	  As	  we	  have	  explained	  
above,	  we	  are	  little	  convinced	  that	  an	  apocalyptic	  consciousness—one	  tempered,	  of	  course,	  by	  the	  good	  
breeding	   inherent	  to	  Doctors	  of	  Philosophy—undermines	  the	  obvious	   fealty	  to	   intellectual	   intercourse	  
that	  ostensibly	   took	  place	  at	   the	  conference	   (though	  we	  have	  been	   to	  plenty	  of	  conferences	   in	  which	  
nothing	  of	  the	  sort	  occurred).	  Thinking	  things	  through—as	  good	  as	  that	  makes	  us	  feel—hardly	  obviates	  
what’s	  going	  on	  on	  the	  ground.	  Nor	  does	  an	  eye	  to	  the	  ongoing	  collapse	  necessarily	  “breach	  the	  topics’	  
complexity,”	   or	   manifest	   in	   “environmentalist	   propaganda”	   (Bartosch	   and	   Garrard	   5).	   The	   “ethos	   of	  
critical	   and	   democratic	   pedagogy”	   that	   Bartosch	   and	   Garrard	   undoubtedly	   support	   was,	   regrettably,	  
shut	   down	   by	   the	   language	   of	   the	   CFP,	   which	  was	   itself	   an	   attempt	   to	   circumscribe	   the	   discourse	   it	  
wished	   to	   enhance.	  And	   though	  we	   are	   sympathetic	   to	   their	   aim	  of	   not	   putting	   off	   participants	   from	  
other	  disciplines	  who	  might	  “find	   it	  peculiar	   that	  ecocritics	  unashamedly	  propagate	   their	  agendas	  and	  
personal	  views”	  (5),	  we	  can’t	  help	  but	  observe	  that	  perhaps	  the	  more	  salient	  point	  is	  that	  ecocritics	  at	  
least	  know	  they	  have	  agendas	  whereas	  the	  trouble	  with	  some	  disciplinary	  scholars	   is	  that	  they	  naively	  
believe	  they	  have	  none.	  	  
	   What	   we	   found,	   at	   any	   rate,	   was	   that	   the	   language	   of	   the	   CFP	   worked	   against	   the	   ecocritical	  
discourse,	   to	   which	   we	   are	   all	   volunteers,	   and	   against	   us,	   as	   potential	   contributors,	   and	   thus	   it	   did	  
damage	  to	  that	  hard	  ethical	  kernel	  that	  causes	  us	  to	  gravitate	  together.	  We	  suppose	  that	  we	  represent	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those	   who	   have,	   for	   good	   or	   ill,	   “fall[en	   ]	   into	   the	   mode	   of	   environmentalist	   propaganda”	   and	  
“succumb[ed	  ]	  to	  warnings	  and	  claims	  to	  catastrophic	  urgency”	  yet	  who	  are	  still	  wanting	  to	  “reconcile	  
with	  an	  ethos	  of	  critical	  and	  democratic	  pedagogy.”	  	  We	  represent	  those	  who	  do	  not	  think	  catastrophic	  
urgency	  must	   come	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   pedagogy;	   we	   think,	   rather,	   that	   pedagogy—and	  
criticism-­‐-­‐must	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  catastrophe.	  
	   Finally,	   we—Thelma	   and	   Louise!-­‐-­‐offer	   this	   poem	   by	   Emily	   Dickinson	   to	   contrast	   the	   ecocritical	  
stance	  of	  Bartosch	  and	  Garrard,	  as	   they	  “bear	  patient	  witness—even	   to	   the	  crack	  of	  doom,”	  with	  our	  
own,	  precarious	  perch	  over	  the	  cliff’s	  edge:	  
	  	  	  	  
"Faith"	  is	  a	  fine	  invention	  
For	  Gentlemen	  who	  see!	  
But	  Microscopes	  are	  prudent	  
In	  an	  Emergency!	  
	  
	  -­‐-­‐Emily	  Dickinson	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1	  Here	  is	  the	  full	  CFP	  for	  “Teaching	  the	  Environment:	  Transdisciplinary	  Perspectives”:	  	  
	  
“We	  are	  looking	  for	  contributors	  to	  a	  transdisciplinary	  symposium	  on	  the	  didactical	  implementations	  of	  
ecocriticism,	  critical	  animal	  studies	  and	  green	  cultural	  studies.	  a	  special	  emphasis	  on	  transdisciplinary	  
perspectives,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  tenets	  of	  these	  academic	  fields	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  
daily	  practice	  of	  teaching	  the	  humanities	  and	  arts	  –	  without	  either	  breaching	  the	  topics’	  complexity,	  falling	  
into	  the	  mode	  of	  environmentalist	  propaganda	  or	  succumbing	  to	  warnings	  and	  claims	  to	  catastrophic	  urgency	  
which	  are	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  an	  ethos	  of	  critical	  and	  democratic	  pedagogy.	  
	  
We	  hope	  to	  enable	  truly	  transdisciplinary	  dialogues	  and	  therefore,	  we	  welcome	  teachers	  just	  as	  well	  as	  
theoreticians	  from	  academia	  whose	  topics	  may	  comprise,	  but	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  restricted	  to,	  environmental	  
and	  animal	  studies,	  green	  didactics,	  eco-­‐composition,	  posthumanism,	  the	  sciences,	  and	  related	  fields.	  With	  
this	  broad	  focus	  and	  the	  variety	  of	  topics	  that	  it	  allows,	  we	  hope	  to	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  transdisciplinary	  
connections	  in	  an	  inextricably	  interconnected	  world.”	  
	  
2	  There	  is	  a	  grim	  joke	  that	  embodies	  this	  combination	  of	  deferral	  and	  denial	  so	  typical	  of	  contemporary	  culture:	  
Doctor:	  I	  have	  some	  very	  bad	  news.	  You	  have	  inoperable	  cancer.	  Terminal.	  I	  estimate	  you	  have	  less	  than	  three	  
weeks	  to	  live.	  Patient:	  I	  understand.	  I’ll	  be	  out	  of	  town	  this	  summer.	  Can	  we	  schedule	  the	  treatments	  to	  begin	  in	  
September?	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